Blog

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

It is as clear as can be. Only by reqyuiring MANDATORY PHYSICAL DELIVERY for all "Penny Stocks" with 3 day settlement and 4 more days grace period can short selling be permanently eliminated. Who are we kidding?

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Great comment letter Bob!
I have been telling everyone I know to submit a comment.
They are taking baby steps but I think the SEC is slowly realizing they have to do something meaningful. Too many of us know what is going on and sooner or later, one of these lawsuits will reveal their participation in organized crime.

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/04/21/sec-wants-more-funding/

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Senators Call for Examination of SEC’s Enforcement Division

Democratic Senators Christopher Dodd and Jack Reed recently asked the Government Accountability Office to initiate an examination of the SEC’s Enforcement Division. Specifically, Dodd (the Banking Committee Chairman) and Reed (the Securities Subcommittee Chairman) are focused on whether the SEC has fundamentally altered its enforcement policy. “There has been less emphasis on investor protection and more on this issue of the competitiveness of markets,” according to Reed.

This is the second time in 18 months that a member of Congress has called for an investigation into the ways the SEC is doing business. And no wonder. The Senators cite the fact that the SEC reduced by 50% last year the penalties it required firms and individuals to pay in connection with enforcement actions. They also note that the Commission lowered by over one-half the amount of corporate disgorgements that it ordered. No doubt the Senators feel that the SEC has grown lax, considering that in 2007, investors on their own recovered approximately $6 billion in fraud-related losses in private litigation -- according to yesterday’s PomTalk post, “The Power of Myth.”

In fact, the SEC seems to be “bending over backward to not discomfit the banks and firms it regulates,” according to a New York Times commentator (in an editorial accessible here). We would point out that there have been a number of distressing changes made at the Commission by former Republican Congressman Christopher Cox -- now Chairman of the SEC. For one thing, since taking the helm in 2005, Chairman Cox has given his commissioners increased authority over enforcement penalties -- taking that authority away from SEC staff attorneys.

Indeed, SEC lawyers have begun complaining about the commissioners’ exercise of this authority -- and the concomitant reduction of fines and penalties levied on wrongdoers. One particular instance, discussed by the Times in an earlier article (accessible here), involved the commissioners’ reduction of a settlement reached with JPMorgan Chase. The bank had already agreed to pay a $25 million settlement when the commissioners voted to reduce that amount by over 90% -- to $2 million.

Chairman Cox defended the new policy earlier this month, saying that it ensures that enforcement staff have the “full backing of the commission” when they “seek to obtain the best possible results for America’s investors.” One must wonder, though, how “America’s investors” feel about the whole thing. For it was their SEC that recovered a mere one-twelfth of what they were able to recover in their own private litigation efforts last year.


http://www.pomtalk.com:80/pomtalk/2008/04/senators-call-f.html

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

International organized criminals are manipulating securities exchanges and engaging in sophisticated fraud schemes that rob U.S. investors, consumers, and government agencies of billions of dollars."

For Immediate Release - FBI National Press Office
April 23, 2008

Washington D.C.
FBI National Press Office
(202) 324-3691


Department of Justice Launches New Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Increasing Threat of International Organized Crime
Today, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey announced a new strategy in the fight against international organized crime that will address this growing threat to U.S. security and stability. The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime (the strategy) was developed following an October 2007 International Organized Crime Threat Assessment (IOC Threat Assessment) and will address the demand for a strategic, targeted, and concerted U.S. response to combat the identified threats. This strategy builds on the broad foundation the Administration has developed in recent years to enhance information sharing, and to secure U.S. borders and financial systems from a variety of transnational threats.

Today's announcement by the Attorney General was made during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies with Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice S. Fisher, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Deputy Director John S. Pistole and Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Julie Myers.

International organized crime is defined as those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate internationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary, and commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and violence. International organized criminals operate in hierarchies, clans, networks, and cells. The crimes they commit vary as widely as the organizational structures they employ.

The strategy establishes an investigation and prosecution framework as committed and connected as the international organized crime structure it must combat. U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, in an unprecedented cooperative effort on this issue, will share international organized crime information and intelligence, collectively identify and prioritize the most significant threats, and then put the full force of U.S. law enforcement’s expertise and resources toward mitigating those threats. In addition, U.S. law enforcement will increase cooperation with international partners to bring international criminals to justice, in the United States and abroad.

The strategy specifically reacts to the globalization of legal and illegal business; advances in technology, particularly the Internet; and the evolution of symbiotic relationships between criminals, public officials, and business leaders that have combined to create a new, less restrictive environment within which international organized criminals can operate. Without the necessity of a physical presence, U.S. law enforcement must combat international organized criminals that target the relative wealth of the people and institutions in the United States while remaining outside the country.

“As international organized criminals have adapted their tactics over time and embraced emerging technology, we too must adapt,” said Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey. “With this strategy, we're building a new, 21st century program that we believe will be nimble enough to fight the threat of international organized crime for years to come.”

“International organized criminals have broadened the scope and depth of their illegal activities, reaching into a variety of sectors to sustain their inherent quest for money and power. These modern-day criminals threaten our physical, economic and national security, indeed, in many circumstances without even setting foot inside U.S. borders,” said Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher. “With this strategy, international organized criminals will be targeted and prosecuted in the same determined and concerted manner in which they pursue their illegal activities.”

Laid out in the strategy is a comprehensive and detailed plan that will enable the Department of Justice and nine federal law enforcement agencies to gather their collective resources to most effectively combat the threat of international organized crime. Ultimately, the strategy aims to create consensus among domestic law enforcement in identifying the most significant priority targets and then unified and concerted action among domestic and international law enforcement in significantly disrupting and dismantling those targets. This unprecedented coordination will include utilizing all available U.S. government programs and capabilities, including existing economic, consular, and other non-law enforcement means.

In addition, as a response to international organized criminals’ ability to operate unconstrained by national borders and geographic law enforcement jurisdictions, the strategy aims to ensure criminal laws and operating procedures reflect the modern realities and needs of international crime fighting. Similarly vital is the need to work in collaboration with public and private institutions that also face victimization by international organized criminals and therefore have been forced to act to minimize the impact on their businesses.

Prior to the strategy’s development, the Department of Justice and law enforcement partners conducted a comprehensive assessment of international organized crime.The IOC Threat Assessment lays out the threat international organized crime poses to U.S. national security, the stability of the U.S. economy, and the integrity of government institutions, infrastructure and systems in the United States. The assessment is based on the best available information known to the U.S. government through the combined efforts of the law enforcement, intelligence, and interagency communities.

Specifically, the IOC Threat Assessment identifies and defines eight strategic threats:

International organized criminals have penetrated the energy market and other strategic sectors of the U.S. and world economy. As U.S. energy needs continue to grow, so too could the power of those who control energy resources.
International organized criminals provide logistical and other support to terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and foreign governments, all with interests acutely adverse to those of U.S. national security.
International organized criminals traffic in people and contraband goods, bringing people and products through U.S. borders to the detriment of border security, the U.S. economy, and the health and lives of those human beings exploited by human trafficking.
International organized criminals exploit the U.S. and international financial system to move illegal profits and funds, including sending billions of dollars in illicit funds through the U.S. financial system annually. To continue this practice, they seek to corrupt financial service providers globally.
International organized criminals use cyberspace to target U.S. victims and infrastructure, jeopardizing the security of personal information, the stability of business and government infrastructures, and the security and solvency of financial investment markets.
International organized criminals are manipulating securities exchanges and engaging in sophisticated fraud schemes that rob U.S. investors, consumers, and government agencies of billions of dollars.
International organized criminals have successfully corrupted public officials around the world, including in countries of vital strategic importance to the United States, and continue to seek ways to influence—legally or illegally—U.S. officials.
International organized criminals use violence and the threat of violence as a basis of power.
“The activities of transnational and national organized criminal enterprises are increasing in scope and magnitude as these groups continue to strengthen their networking with each other to expand their operations,” said FBI Deputy Director John S. Pistole. “By increasing international cooperation and information sharing, together we can disrupt and dismantle these global, sophisticated organizations that have exploited geopolitical, economic, social, and technological changes over the last two decades to become increasingly active worldwide.”

“Partnerships among law enforcement agencies are our most effective weapon in combating international criminal networks,” said Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for ICE. “These criminal organizations pursue profit, without regard for national boundaries, international laws or human life.”

On April 7, 2008, the Organized Crime Council, chaired by Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip, recommended, and the Attorney General signed The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime. The Attorney General has been in charge of coordinating all federal law enforcement activity against organized crime since a 1968 executive order by President Lyndon Johnson established that authority.

Similarly, the Organized Crime Council has existed in various forms since 1970 and has always been charged with establishing priorities and formulating a national unified strategy to combat organized crime. This is the first time the Organized Crime Council has ever convened to focus on the threat from international organized crime and to develop a responsive strategy to that threat. The Organized Crime Council consists of the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, the Chair of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee and the leaders of nine participating federal law enforcement agencies, which include: Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Secret Service; Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Postal Inspection Service; Diplomatic Security; and U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of the Inspector General.



# # #

http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel08/ioc042308.htm

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Cox is sitting on his hands and the following article makes one wonder if he is hiding dirty nails or just a completely oblivious dupe and shill for WS.

John Olagues is the owner and principal consultant for Truth IN Options and a recognized authority on listed and employee stock options.

After graduating from Tulane University (where he captained the baseball team and set many of Tulane's pitching records), John applied his B.A. in mathematics and his competitive spirit to the real world of stock options.

In 1976, John became a member of the Pacific Stock Exchange in San Francisco trading and managing options positions in scores of different stocks. John joined with Blair Hull to create Options Research, the first service to provide theoretical options values to market-makers and to the general public. In 1980, he became a member of the CBOE, where he personally traded more options in more diverse situations than any other trader.
Mr. Olagues was contacted and asked for permission to repost his article with his bio. He was asked whether or not anyone from the mainstream financial press had contacted him regarding an interview or giving his article greater exposure?

His reply:

You can do with it what you wish. I have not had any calls or emails from the main stream media as they will not criticize the FED or J.P. Morgan. I am saying the J.P. Morgan essentially stole $30 billion from the tax payers through the FED and did a big favor for the short sellers, who probably made a few billion. From Cox to Bernanke, to Dimon and Cramer, they all played their roles.

This article is about how Bear Stearns stock was artificially collapsed so that illegal insider traders would make billions and J.P. Morgan would be paid $55 billion of US tax payer money to shore themselves up - and buy Bear Stearns at bankruptcy prices.

Massive buying of puts and shorting stock in Bear Stearns

On March 10, 2008, the closing price of Bear Stearns was 70. The stock had traded at 70 eight weeks earlier. On or prior to March 10, 2008 requests were made to the options exchanges to open new April series of puts with exercise prices of 20, and 22.5, and a new March series with an exercise price of 25.

Their requests were accommodated and new series were opened for trading March 11, 2008. Since there was very little subsequent trading in the call with exercise prices of 20, 22.5 or 25, it is certain that the requests were made with the intentions of buying substantial amounts of the puts.

There was in fact massive volumes of puts purchased in those series which opened on March 11, 2008.

For example: between March 11-14 inclusive, there were 20,000 contracts traded in the April 20s, 3700 contracts traded in the April 22.5s, and 8000 contracts traded in the April 25s. In the March 25s, there were 79,000 contracts traded between March 11-14, 2008.

Question: Why did the options exchanges not open the far out of the money puts for trading the first time that Bear Stearns stock hit 70, when the April and March options had far more time to expiration?

Certainly if the requesters were legitimate hedgers or speculators, their buying the March and April puts with 2 and 3 months to expiration was more reasonable.

Answer: The insiders were not ready to collapse the stock and did not request the exchanges to open the new series when Bear Stearns first hit 70.

Second Request and Accommodation

On or prior to March 13, 2008, an additional request was made of the options exchanges to open more March and April put series with very low exercise prices.

These new March put options would have just five days of trading to expiration.

The exchanges accommodated their requests, knowing that the intentions of the requesters were to buy puts. They indeed bought massive amounts of puts. For example the March 20 puts traded nearly 50,000 contracts (i.e. contracts to sell 5 million shares at 20). The March 15s traded 9600, the March 10s traded 13,000 and the March 5s traded 6300 all on March 14 (the first day of trading of the new March series).

The introduction of those far-out-of-the-money put series in the April and March months immediately before the crash provided a vehicle whereby extreme leverage was available

to the insiders. In other words if an insider had $100,000 and he knew that Morgan would buy Bear Stearns at 2, he could make 5-10 times more on the $100,000 by buying the newly introduced March puts. This is so because the soon to expire far out-of-the-money puts were far cheaper than the July or October out-of-the-money puts. And that is why the illegal inside traders requested the exchanges to introduce the far out-of-the-moneys just days before the crash.

But this scenario has serious implications.

This means that the deal was already arranged on March 10 or before. That contradicts the scenario that is promoted by SEC Chairman Cox, Fed Boss Bernanke, Bear CEO Schwartz, Jamie Dimon of J.P. Morgan (who sits on the board of directors for the New York Federal Reserve Bank) and others that false rumors undermined the confidence in Bear Stearns making the company crash, notwithstanding their adequate liquidity days before.

“I would say that the deal was arranged months before but the final terms and times were not determined until maybe March 7-8, 2008.”

On March 14, 2008, the April 17.5s, the 15s, the 12.5s and the 10s traded 15,000 contracts combined. Each put gives the right to sell 100 shares. So for example, these 15,000 April puts gave the purchaser(s) the right to sell 1.5 million shares at prices between 10 and 17.5. Those purchasers expected to make profits on 1.5 million shares because they knew the deal was coming at $2.00. That is the only plausible explanation for anyone to buy puts with five days of life remaining with strike prices far below the market price.

So there were requests, during the period of March 10-13, to the exchanges to open the March and April series for buying massive amounts of extremely out-of-the-money puts, which were accommodated by the options exchanges. Did the Exchanges aid and abet the insider trading scheme?

Media statements of adequate liquidity

However, Reuters, on March 10, 2008 was citing Bear Stearns sources that there was no liquidity crisis and that there was no truth to the speculation of liquidity problems. And none other than the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 11, 2008 was stating that "we have a good deal of comfort with the capital cushion that these firms have".

We even had the "mad" Jim Cramer proclaiming on March 11, 2008 that all is well with Bear Stearns and that the viewers should hold on to their Bear Stearns.

On March 12, 2008, Alan Schwartz CEO of Bear Stearns was telling David Faber of CNBC that there was no problem with liquidity and that "We don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis".

The fact that the requests were made on March 10 or earlier that those new series be opened and those requests were accommodated together with the subsequent massive open positions in those newly opened series is conclusive proof that there were some who knew about the collapse in advance, while Reuters, Cox, Schwartz and Cramer were telling the public that there was no liquidity problem.

“This was no case of a sudden development on the 13 or 14th, where things changed dramatically making it such that they needed a bail-out immediately.”

The collapse was anticipated and prepared for, even while the CEO of Bear Stearns and the SEC Chairman were making claims of stability.

What was the reason why Cramer, Cox and Schwartz were all promoting Bear Stearns immediately before its collapse? That will be speculated upon for years to come.

Cramer has admitted that "truth" was not his friend and that he manipulated stocks to influence investors behavior. Was this one of his acts? But no apologies from Cramer as he claims now that he was referring to keeping money in Bear Stearns Bank - not in Bear Stearns stock.

Proof of Insider Trading:

To prove the case of illegal insider trading, all the Feds have to do is ask a few questions of the persons who bought puts on Bear Stearns or shorted stock during the week before March 17, 2008 and before.

All the records are easily available. If they bought puts or shorted stock, just ask them why? What information did they have access to which the CEO and the SEC did not have? Where did they get the info? Why aren't Cramer and Cox, Dimon, Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson, Faber and Schwartz subject to a bit of prosecutorial pressure to get to the bottom of this? Maybe the buyers of puts and short sellers of stock just didn't believe Reuters, Cox, Schwartz, Cramer and Faber and went massively short anyway, buying puts that required a 70% drop in a week? Maybe they had better information than Schwartz or Cox? If they did, then that's a felony, with the profits made subject to forfeiture. April 4, 2008 Congressional Hearings on the Bear Stearns Bail-out: I watched both sessions and drew the following conclusions: In the first session there were the following witnesses; Bernanke of the Federal Reserve Board, Cox from the SEC, Geithner representing the New York Reserve Bank and an incidental player Mr. Steel from the Treasury. The only Senators that seem to be willing to attack these bankers were Bunning, Tester, Menedez and Reed. All the rest were useless and very respectful. Absurdities: All witnesses did their best to keep their stories consistent but they did slip up a bit. They all agree that the bail-out was necessary without any proof that it was. They all agreed that what caused the cash liquidity to dry up within one day was ‘rumor mongers’. Apparently it is claimed that some people have the ability to start false rumors about Bear Stearns's and other banks liquidity, which then starts a "run on the bank". These rumor mongers allegedly were able to influence companies like Goldman Sachs to terminate doing business with Bear Stearns, notwithstanding that Goldman et al. believed that Bear Stearns balance sheet was in good shape. (Goldman, between March 11-14 warned their average customers that Bear Stearns stock was "hard to borrow" for shorting due to the fact that other customers had used up all of the stock available for borrowing for short sales). That idea that rumors caused a "run on the bank" at Bear Stearns is 100% ridiculous. Perhaps that's the reason why every witness was so guarded and hesitant and looked so strained in answering questions. Loans to J.P. Morgan total $55 billion from FED. The Private New York FED lent $25 billion to Bear Stearns (described as the primary facility by James Dimon) and another $30 billion to J.P. Morgan (described as the secondary facility by James Dimon).

So the bail-out cost was $55 billion not the $30 billion that is promoted. This was revealed at the second session of the Senate hearings in a James Dimon response to a question from Senator Reed. Who gets the $55 billion?

J.P. Morgan received the money on a loan pledging Bear Stearns assets valued at $55 billion. $29 billion is non-recourse to Morgan. Effectively the FED received collateral appraised by Bear Stearns at $55 billion for a loan to J.P. Morgan of $55 billion.

“That's a loan to value of 100%.” If the value of the secondary facility of $30 billion ($29 billion of which is non recourse) is worth only $15 billion when all is said and done, then J.P. Morgan has to pay back only $1 billion of the $30 billion received and keeps the $14 billion the Fed loses. If the $25 billion primary facility is worth only $15 billion when all is said and done, J.P. Morgan has to pay $10 billion of the $25 billion received. If J.P Morgan can not pay, then the Fed loses the $10 billion. If after all is said and done, the $25 billion primary assets or the $30 billion secondary assets are sold for more that $25 billion or the $30 billion respectively, the difference goes to J.P. No matter how you cut it, J.P. Morgan wins. If the $55 billion assets turn out to be worth only $20 billion when all is said and done, J.P. Morgan owes $1 billion on the $30 billion and the difference between $25 billion and the value received on the primary facility.

“The best the FED can do: get their money back with interest. The worst they can do is lose $25 -$40 billion.”

The FED would have been far better to just buy the assets at Bear's and J.P. Morgan's valuation. The question arises:

Why didn't the FED just make the $55 billion loan to Bear Stearns directly?

The FED received Bear Stearns assets valued by Bear Stearns as its only collateral for the 100% loan. I am sure that Bear Stearns would have guaranteed the full $55 billion and would have advanced more collateral and accepted a 90% loan to value. Everything would have been just fine for Bear Stearns and the FED would have had a better deal. But the Bear Stearns stock would have gone up and all short stock sellers and all put buyers would have massive losses instead of massive gains.

“The bail-out is a great deal for J.P. Morgan, the illegal insider short sellers got a great deal. Bear Stearns stock holders and employees got a very bad deal and the sellers of puts sustained large losses.”

This shows, in my view, that J.P. Morgan and the FED were in collusion with the short sellers and put buyers.

~John Olagues~

Conclusion: by bthomson

Bear Stearns demise served as a façade to recapitalize none other than J.P. Morgan.

You see, J.P. Morgan’s derivatives book is 2 – 3 times bigger than Citibank’s – and it was derivatives that caused losses of more than 30 billion at Citibank [14.1 billion Q1/08 and 18.1 billion Q4/07]. So, it only made common sense that J.P. Morgan had to be a little more than “knee deep” in the same stuff that Citibank was – but how do tell the market that a bank – ANY BANK – needs to be recapitalized to the tune of 50 – 80 billion?

Now, it appears, we know the answer to that question.

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Ms. Helburn (or anyone else):

Can you please give me a cite for that article/commentary by Mr. Olagues? I have a few people that need to see it.

For all:

I read something funny this morning in Proverbs 26:27: "If a man digs a pit, he will fall into it; if a man rolls a stone, it will roll back on him." Bear Stearns was a major player in the prime brokerage / market manipulation business, for themselves as a market maker and of course for all the whores they provided services to. The stone has rolled back on them, so to speak, just as it did for Refco a few months ago. Don't think this is going to end with Bear. It is a universal rule that one reaps what he sows. Heaven help the taxpayers and the investing public when JP Morgan gets a visit from the reaper (the bank of course, since old JP himself is already 'enjoying' his eternal reward).

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Rats alway desert a sinking ship, is the first shoe about to drop on Goldman?

Goldman Sachs mortgage head Dan Sparks quits
Marketwatch - April 25, 2008 4:50 PM ET


Related Quotes
Symbol Last Chg
GS Trade 192.00 +3.21
MER Trade 49.64 +1.55
CS Trade 54.91 +0.85
Quotes delayed at least 15 minutes

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- The head of Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s mortgage department, Dan Sparks, will leave for personal reasons, a spokesperson for the investment banking giant said Friday.

Sparks will be replaced by the head of U.S. credit trading, Justin Gmelich, and the head of credit sales, Thomas Cornacchia, said a person familiar with the matter.

Sparks will stay on to oversee any transition in the department.

At Goldman Sachs' (GS), Sparks led the mortgage department for less than two years, but had been with Goldman for almost two decades in various capacities, trading various securities.

The Wall Street Journal reported Sparks' expected departure on its Web site Friday afternoon.

Among its investment banking rivals, Goldman was the unequivocal winner in a year that saw most rocked by bad investments in subprime mortgage-related securities.

Global banks have lost almost $300 billion on the investments overall, causing a ripple effect that put the deep freeze on credit markets and tightened lending standards for borrowers.

Goldman, however, not only avoided entangling itself in some of these subprime-related products, but it also instituted a successful short-selling philosophy that bet the market for such securities would fail. It ultimately won big on this bet.

Indeed, in its fourth quarter filings for 2007, Goldman said "significant losses in non-prime loans and securities were more than offset by gains on short mortgage positions."

Goldman lost around $4 billion on bad write-downs related to the subprime fallout, a smaller amount than major competitors such as Merrill Lynch and Co. (MER), which lost almost $30 billion. Switzerland's Credit Suisse (CS) lost $38 billion..

Goldman also remains one of the world's most liquid larger banks. Wachovia Corp. research analysts estimated last week that the bank has as much as $80 billion in liquidity, up from $60 billion in the fourth quarter

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

SEC Must Turn Over Documents In Whistle-Blower Case
Liz Moyer, 04.29.08, 5:20 PM ET

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has to cough up thousands of pages of transcripts, trading records, e-mails and other documents it tried to keep confidential in its ongoing battle with its former investigator and would-be whistle-blower Gary Aguirre.

A federal judge in Washington issued the order Monday, saying the SEC was to release the sought-after papers, with a few exceptions, to Aguirre by May 23.

The story starts three years ago, when Aguirre was in the middle of an aggressive investigation into what he saw as suspicious trading by Pequot Capital, a $15 billion New York hedge fund. His investigation would lead him to the door of Morgan Stanley chief John Mack, an investor in Pequot and a close associate of Pequot founder Art Samberg.

Aguirre was pursuing allegations of insider trading. Pequot piled on $18 million in profits from its positions in General Electric and Heller Financial stock in the summer of 2001, positions taken right before those companies announced a merger. Alleged: Pequot based those trades on inside information it had about the deal. During the year in question, Mack had held positions at Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse, the investment banks that advised on the GE-Heller transaction.

The SEC investigation never went anywhere because Aguirre was fired in September 2005 after he tried to get approval to interview Mack about his knowledge of the deal. Aguirre took his beef to the Senate in 2006, accusing the SEC of quashing his investigation because it got too close to the powerful and well-connected Mack.

Last year the Senate issued a blistering 100-plus page report on Aguirre's Pequot investigation, his firing and the conduct of the SEC in handing Aguirre's complaints about both. The report, a joint project of the Judiciary and Finance committees, accused the SEC of being "overly deferential" to Mack and of various conflicts and missteps in its investigation of insider trading, not to mention retaliation.

The Senate has been increasingly critical of the SEC in recent months, especially in regard to the mid-March blowup of Bear Stearns. In a hearing earlier this month, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox was peppered with questions about the agency's role in monitoring Bear Stearns before and after its collapse and sale to JPMorgan Chase. And some Senators have raised questions on why the SEC dropped a 2005 investigation into how Bear Stearns priced and sold collateralized debt obligations, the structured securities that are at the core of the market meltdown.

But the agency has resisted calls for greater disclosure about its surveillance and enforcement activities. In an April 16 letter to Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa, Cox wrote that the agency wouldn't disclose the existence or nonexistence of an investigation into Bear Stearns.

Aguirre is determined to hold the SEC accountable for its activities, however. He has been trying to get a hold of the documents related to his investigation and his own employment with the agency under a Freedom of Information Act request. The SEC, which has already turned over thousands of documents, has held back some others claiming exemptions under the Investment Advisors Act, mostly dealing with confidentiality.

But the judge on Monday disagreed with most of the SEC's arguments, and now it has to turn over Pequot trading records, pages of transcripts of interviews with Samberg and others, e-mails of SEC staffers, and other papers, and it has to prove it did a thorough search for items allegedly missing from the personnel file it turned over to Aguirre already.

The judge set a conference for June 17.

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

And just who bought all those airline puts before 9-11........hmmmmmmm - we never got an answer..imagine our government with all of its resources available and being at war, unable to track down the buyers....WTF are we doing????????

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

the dominos are in motion all will fall.
the brokerages and banks in bed with the hedge funds all these years HAVE the disaese it will kill them.
the counterfieting of stocks bonds and all other 'securitys' is coming home to roost.
selling things that don't exist is criminal and crime costs everyone.
NOW WE ALL WILL PAY.
what can be done about it?
I don't know.
I want the peplle who did this named in public to all of us who are giong to pay and pay and pay.
there are PEOPLE to be named behind this, the riots and ruin ahead should be taken to them PERSONALLY.
The train is off the tracks the wreck is going on the passengers are being hurt the responsible partys must be held accountable.

P.S ....Bud where are you you are missed!

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

http://cryptogon.com/

What we have here isn’t some, “unseen hand of the market.” It’s more like a bunch of tentacles.

Henry Paulson is the United States Treasury Secretary. He’s also a former CEO of Goldman Sachs.

Joshua Bolten is the current White House Chief of Staff. He served as Goldman’s executive director for legal and government affairs in between 1994 and 1999. His father worked for CIA.

Stephen Friedman served as chairman of President George W. Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since December 2005. Friedman had worked for Goldman Sachs for 30 years. He is a current member of the Goldman Sachs Board of Directors.

Robert Rubin, U.S. Treasury Secretary during both Clinton terms, previously worked for Goldman Sachs from 1966 to 1992. From 1990 to 1992, Rubin served as Co-Chairman and Co-Senior Partner along with Stephen Friedman (see above). Rubin is now Director and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Citigroup, the largest company in the world (assetts in excess of $2 trillion). He also happens to be co-chairman of the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations.

John Thain, the current CEO of Merrill Lynch, previously served as President, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer of Goldman Sachs.

Thomas Montag, recently hired by Thain to serve as the head of trading for Merrill Lynch, retired from Goldman Sachs after 22 years. His last position was head of sales and trading in the Americas.

Which other Goldman Sachs alumni should we be aware of?

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Our Gov. as we have seen allows all types of criminal activity (see above:By mhelburn on 4/24/2008 4:40) riht out in plain veiw of us all and they know nothing will or can be done. For now.

But....as Jeremiah 9:24 pointed out above it is stated by God that we reap what we sow.

These criminals are willing to flaunt this in the face of man but I am willing to wait for that time when they won't be able to flaunt it in the face of God!

I'd rather be poor here and now then to have to face what they have coming!

And no, if they don't change, and repent, then saying may God have mercy on their souls at that point will be forever too late as he will not. Check the Book.

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

jeremiah... you should be able to find the article here on this website..

http://www.optionsforemployees.com/

article here http://www.optionsforemployees.com/articles/idx/0/130/article/Bear_Stearns_BuyOut_100_Fraud.html

Re: A Suggested Comment Letter on the Latest SEC Absurdity - Proposed Rule S7-08-08

Just in case you did not for whatever obvious reason did not know how corrupt the SEC really is read the following in its entirety. Its bound to wake you up. You after reading this will understand What Bobo, Patrick, Dave Patch Bud Burrell ect has been communicating all along.. And that is that the Market is rigged in the favor of Wall Street and their Hedge Fund buddies and against us!!PERIOD!!

http://investigatethesec.com/drupal-5.5/files/Order042808.pdf